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Economists have traditionally modelled human behaviour by assuming individuals maximise their personal
happiness subject to some form of constraint, budgetary or otherwise. They tended to say relatively little about the
effect of relationships between family, friends, neighbours and work colleagues. Such neglect reflected perhaps not
an ignorance of the importance of such interactions, but rather an awareness of how difficult it is to model
theoretically, and measure empirically, such phenomena.
In our study we model and measure the role of cooperation within a very particular interaction and outcome:
workplace absenteeism. In so doing, we shed light of one of the central issues regarding human behaviour. To what
extent, if any, do people care about others?
Within our model, workers are assumed to have a tolerance level of sickness determined by wages, sick pay and
working hours. The decision to absent depends on a worker’s realised health and their corresponding ‘reservation’
level of sickness – i.e. the level of sickness at which they are indifferent between attending and absenting. This
reservation level is related to the employment contract – workers are more likely to attend the higher the wage and
the lower level of sick pay and/or contractual hours.
We apply the model to a two-worker framework within which work is interdependent. The absence of one worker
imposes a cost on the other worker. We think of this cost possibly in terms of the additional effort that workers have
to exert to compensate for the absence of their colleague. We predict that if workers are selfish and do not care
about one another, then they will be more or less likely to absent than a worker working in isolation. If, however, they
care, then they will unequivocally absent less.
We test our model by comparing the absence rates of workers who actually do work either alone or in pairs. Our
data comprise the daily absence records of sixty-four optometrists working in one of the twenty-two practices of a
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private ophthalmic optician company in the northeast of Scotland over the period April 2005 – September 2008. The
optometrists are professional service providers who examine eyes, prescribe spectacles or contact lenses, give
advice on visual problems and detect any ocular disease or abnormality, referring the patient to a medical
practitioner if necessary.
In our sample, practices that have one examination room always have one and only one optometrist for eye
examinations. We label this examination ‘single-testing’. Other practices have two examination rooms and may
accommodate two optometrists for ‘double-testing’. By comparing the absence records between single-testing and
double-testing practices, we are able to test whether workers behave competitively or cooperatively.
When an optometrist is absent, the scheduled appointments are cancelled and rescheduled unless a substitute
optometrist is found. Optometrists are constrained in the number of eye examinations (i.e. appointments) they can
perform during a day by the National Health Service (NHS) Scotland. Therefore, optometrists who are absent one
day are not expected to make up all cancellations the next day.
Furthermore, they are unaware a priori whether or not a substitute optometrist will be sent to the practice. Hence,
we assume that when making the decision whether to absent, both single and double-testing optometrists face the
same expected cost of absence in terms of the eye examinations that they will have to perform once they return to
work. Double-testing optometrists are close substitutes in production since in the absence of one optometrist the
other optometrist, under the terms of their employment contract, may pick up additional appointments, without extra
pay, in order to minimize the cancelling and rescheduling of appointments. The number of working days that
optometrists missed over the sample period due to absence account for 1.3 per cent of their total contracted days.
Our empirical analysis suggests that absence is indeed lower when employees work in pairs rather than in isolation,
a result that lends support to the cooperative equilibrium outcome in our theoretical model. The estimated effects
suggest that moving from single-testing to double-testing reduces the probability of absence by 0.004 percentage
points. Whilst small in absolute terms, with an average absence rate of 1.3 per cent, this implies a potential relative
fall in the probability of absence of 30 per cent.
Our results shed some light on how people interact in the workplace and the effect of that interaction on their
decision to be absent or not. Our study maybe suggests that they do care about each other. They cooperate and in
so doing reduce absence relative to selfish, non-cooperative workers. HR policies that foster and promote a collegial
environment may be an important tool in reducing absence from the workplace and its consequent loss in
productivity. Much (much) more broadly, our study suggests that we should not be entirely pessimistic about the
future of the human race.
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